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BOOK REVIEWS 
Religious Reading: The Place of Reading in the Practice of Religion by Paul J. 
Griffiths. Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. xii + 210. Cloth $39.95. 
PAUL REASONER, Bethel College 
Paul Griffiths argues for the recovery of a particular type of reading, reli-
gious reading, which has as its purpose learning to give a religious account 
of the world. Religious reading assumes and develops a particular relation-
ship between the reader and the world (e.g., [for Christians] "the world is 
to be interpreted in terms of the Bible, written into its margins, so to speak, 
rather than the other way around" (19, my emphasis)). Griffiths claims reli-
gious reading has all but died out and consumerist reading is the dominant 
type of reading in the academic world today, where consumerist reading is 
understood as focusing on "the metaphors of production, consumption, 
use, and control" (42). Memory is central to religious reading, and Griffiths 
offers both moral and practical arguments for the necessity of memory in 
religious reading. The latter part of the book takes up the genres of reli-
gious reading and examines at length commentary and anthology with 
extended discussions of their importance in Buddhist India and Roman 
Africa. While the preceding gives roughly the themes of the book, it fails to 
capture the passion of the text. The book is a serious defense of religious 
reading, a harsh attack against consumerist reading, and a passionate call 
for more converts to religious reading. After a few general comments, I 
will focus on memory, the distinction between religious and consumerist 
reading, and the role of specialists in religious reading. 
Everyone should find something of interest here. Topics include: the 
physical properties of writing and manuscript construction in India (Ch. 5) 
and in Roman Africa (Ch. 6); mnemotechnical devices (memory tech-
niques); descriptions of Buddhist monastic life in India by Chinese 
Buddhist pilgrims; and a discussion of commonplace books in Europe with 
special attention to John Locke's prescription for constructing the index for 
such a book. Lovers of language will find themselves scurrying to the notes 
for further references. 
Griffiths' prose has a bracing freshness and vigor. For example, he intro-
duces the reader to a theory in the first half of a sentence ("Olsen ... has 
recently claimed that systematic thought about the structure of a language 
has the existence and use of writing among its preconditions, ... "), only to 
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refute the theory in the second half of the same sentence by means of a bril-
liantly decisive counter-exarnple (" ... a claim falsified at once by the example 
of Panini, the Indian grammarian, who thought deeply and systematically 
about the structure of the Sanskrit language, but who did so without using 
writing and possibly even without knowing of its existence" (31)). Here and 
there powerfully phrased thoughts beg to be written down into one's com-
monplace book for later use (at least until reading Chapter 4 when the prac-
tice is roundly condemned!}---e.g., "Bilingualism is possible, but bireligion-
ism is not" (12). Savor this selection from a discussion of the catechumal 
stage of those joining the early Christian church: "The oral instruction was 
intended to provide a resonant manifold [echoing George Steiner's phrase] 
of memorized words, to textualize the catechumens, and by so doing trans-
form them into people who, as a result of becoming textualized-having the 
blood in their veins replaced, corpuscle by corpuscle, with the words of 
Scripture-will act in accord with what these words prescribe" (162). 
But readers should be warned that few will corne out unscathed from bit-
ing criticisms. Griffiths is harsh on scholars in biblical studies, religious stud-
ies, anthropology, Indology, and philosophy. Concerning religious studies, 
he writes, "One [irony], most pressing for scholars of religion, is that the very 
intellectual activity that makes possible and largely constitutes the study of 
religion in universities also makes it effectively impossible to understand 
what is studied" (182). Or, consider another instance of Griffiths at his 
polemical best: "Indologists and anthropologists have done more to destroy 
traditional Sanskrit learning than ever Christian missionaries could" (185). 
He also has a sweeping indictment of the university: "University scholars, 
therefore, in their role as creatures of global consumerism, have made major 
contributions to the eradication of religious reading as an intellectual or cul-
tural force of significance" (185). Griffiths argues that the university based 
study of religion is squarely in the consumerist mode. 
The contrast between the consumerist reader and the religious reader is 
sharply illustrated by what each reader does with a text: "The response of a 
consumerist reader to a work like this [Nagarjuna's Sutrasamuccaya 
(Anthology of Sacred Works)] is to make a critical edition of it; that of the 
religious reader is to learn it by heart" (132). Griffiths condemns con-
sumerist reading in part because he believes the strong claim that religious 
texts in the end can only be understood by religious readers. 
Pride of place in the practice of religious reading is given to memory. 
Indeed, Griffiths takes great pains (and rightly so given our culture of litera-
cy) to show that writing and literacy are not necessary for composition, dis-
play, and storage ("learning a work, was a matter of ears, memory, and 
mouth" (147)). Memory is so important in the ideal version of religious read-
ing that Griffiths can summarize this point by saying, "Religious readers, 
paradoxically, need not know how to read" (40). Memory, then, and not 
written records, is the preferred method of storage. In both sustained argu-
ments and scattered comments on the topic of memory throughout the book, 
Griffiths offers reasons for the necessity of memory in religious reading. 
Memory is the preferred method of storage because: (1) there may be techno-
logical difficulty in storing texts on written records (in some times and 
places); (2) creating written records is expensive (in some times and places); 
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(3) memory allows for more instant access to any part of the text (even when 
compared with the current technological search methods); (4) memorizing is 
hard, and what takes more effort is preferred morally from a religious per-
spective; (5) memorized text will (or has the capacity to) change the life, char-
acter, and very being of the one in whose memory the text is stored. 
Some of these reasons (e.g., (1) technological difficulty of storage, or (2) 
expense) are clearly only decisive in particular historical/ cultural contexts. 
However, Griffiths tries to justify the dependence on memory on practical 
grounds even when technological and economic difficulties are not pre-
sent. He claims that retrieval from memory is faster than searches in stor-
age devices such as books or electronic media (see (3) above). These com-
parisons seem forced. However, claims (1) through (3) are not critical. The 
heart of the matter for religious reading lies in the moral claims about (4) 
effort and (5) personal transformation. 
While it takes effort to memorize a text, it also costs something to have a 
text copied or to copy it oneself. Each of these instances is thought to dis-
play one's spiritual intentions, and, in some religious traditions, lead to the 
accrual of merit. Memory does seem to be one marker of spiritual inten-
tion, but it is not the only such marker. 
The strongest argument in moral terms for the superiority of memory 
over other storage devices is that memorized religious texts work internal-
ly to change the person. Religious traditions are replete with examples of 
such positive changes, so I accept this judgment about memory. But to 
nuance the claim, consider two points. 
First, memory is not a sufficient condition for such character transforma-
tion. Memory is possible without depth of understanding. But Griffiths is 
surely correct when he follows Hugh of St. Victor's lead (Didascalicon) 
where memory is considered to be necessary for the rumination out of 
which deep understanding comes. 
Second, unlike his writings elsewhere, Griffiths deliberately avoids talk 
of the truth of religious accounts ("There is always the question of truth; is 
one, none, or several of the religious accounts offered true? But this is not 
my interest here" (14». To be sure, Griffiths does include content in his 
analysis of religious reading (see in particular his discussion of anthology 
and commentary). Griffiths assumes throughout that the internal change 
caused by religious reading is a good thing. Can religious reading be 
defended as a good aside from consideration of the content and truth 
claims of the various religious accounts? 
Depending upon the religious account inculcated, one "sees" the world 
and its people and aspects differently. Since these accounts do differ on 
valuations and meaning given to disparate aspects of life and world, the 
religious reader will be shaped differently depending upon the particular 
tradition followed. The personal transformations may be in conflict across 
religious accounts (e.g., a particular group of people might be honored in 
one account, and castigated by another). So, it seems that the truth claims 
cannot be set aside after all, unless one is willing to argue that religious 
reading in general is a good because it produces some good (not specific to 
a particular religious account) in the religious reader, where that good is 
then specified, e.g., moving away from self-centeredness to other-centered-
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ness (Hick). Griffiths does not offer such an argument here. Rather, he 
argues with passion for the conclusion that consumerist reading (particu-
larly of religious texts) is evil. The implication is that since consumerist 
reading is evil, religious reading must be good. 
Memory also seems to serve for Griffiths as one criterion of distinction 
between religious reading and consumerist reading. He is convincing in 
his demonstration of the centrality of memory in religious reading. But one 
could argue that memory is a crucial ability for consumerist readers as well 
as for religious readers. Good university scholars are famous for their 
memories. They remember reading in a particular journal article precisely 
this or that objection or reply; how to access certain technologically 
advanced research tools; that there is a coffee stain on the page before the 
one where the passage they are looking for appears; and they have memo-
rized passages in key texts in their specialties. While memory alone may 
not be sufficient to distinguish between religious and consumerist reading, 
what is done with memory in the two types of reading is distinguished 
sharply by what the reader expects from the text. In consumerist reading, 
the reader uses the text for personal creative purposes. In religious reading, 
the reader submits to the text and understands the text to be "a stable and 
vastly rich resource" such that there is "no final act of reading" (41). 
Griffiths recognizes that not all persons will be religious readers to the 
same extent. Indeed, he identifies an inner core of virtuosi readers-spe-
cialists-who (1) provide a model of what it means to be a religious read-
er, (2) maintain the purity of the tradition, and (3) determine how the tra-
dition should interact with texts from outside the tradition (here canon 
and index are mentioned with approval (64-65». Specialist readers, as a 
category, are easily understood as those in the religious tradition most 
highly regarded for memory ability, depth of understanding, and inter-
pretive ability based on the memorized texts. Those less advanced in a 
religious tradition aspire to becoming specialist readers; or, alternatively, 
if life commitments yield less time for the practice of religious reading 
they often financially support specialist readers and approve of their place 
in the religious tradition. Specialist readers have mastered the canon and 
assist others in their study of the canon. 
However, when Griffiths includes in the specialist reader the role of 
arbiter of the tradition with the world outside the tradition, e.g., politically 
or with the establishment and protection of the canon and the designation 
of proscribed works (index), the nature of the reading of specialist readers 
begins to blur. Someone within the tradition must have ascertained (by 
reading, presumably) which works are on the index. This type of reading 
would seem to be in the consumerist mode by Griffiths' categorization. 
Furthermore, the very nature of the reading-wide-ranging, topical, once 
through-necessary for keeping an index seems antithetical to the ideal of 
religious reading-focused, slow, committing works to memory, rumina-
tory. Yet, at least some specialist readers seem to be required to have both 
traits. This suggests several threads to untangle. On the one hand, religious 
reading is marked by the kind of reading-focused on traditional texts, 
slow, committing works to memory, ruminatory. On the other hand, reli-
gious reading could also be characterized by the purpose of the reading-to 
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make sense of oneself and the world in terms of the religious account and 
to continually be working out that account more fully. In this latter charac-
terization, some of what appears to be consumerist reading must surely be 
going on, i.e., consumerist reading in terms of the kind of reading-quick, 
cursory, not committing to memory. But it is not consumerist reading in 
terms of the second thread, the purpose of the reading. For consumerist 
reading is self-absorptive, focused on creative production for its own sake, 
whereas religious reading is fundamentally reading aimed at providing a 
better and deeper religious account of the world. 
The questions I have raised about the role of memory and the nature of 
virtuosi readers are only intended to rein in some of Griffiths' analyses 
where the distinctions are drawn perhaps too starkly. His fundamental 
point about the loss of religious reading and its importance in learning and 
living a religious account of the world is surely right. It has implications for 
the future of universities and religious institutions of learning and wor-
ship. It also has personal implications: one should start memorizing, 
choose more carefully what to read, and be more intentional about the task 
of giving a religious account. Griffiths seeks to convert readers to the prac-
tice of religious reading. I have been so converted. 
Characters in Search of Their Author: The Gifford Lectures, Glasgow 1999-2000 
by Ralph McInerny. University of Notre Dame Press, 2001, 132pp. $25.00. 
LAURA GARCIA, Boston College 
In these lectures, presented in Glasgow in October and November of 1999 
and February of 2000, Professor McInerny spins a fascinating tale of the 
history of philosophy since Descartes that reads like a novel. Though he 
finds most of the major modern figures wanting with respect to their philo-
sophical views, they emerge from these pages as living, three-dimensional 
persons, so vividly portrayed that one's previous encounters with them 
seem to have taken place in a kind of philosophical flatland. We follow 
Descartes from his famous dream as a young soldier to his death in 
Stockholm in the presence of his priest and confessor. Looking back to a 
medieval thinker, we pause beside Anselm of Canterbury in "the first stall 
on the left in the monastery at Bec in Normandy," chanting Psalm 41: "The 
fool has said in his heart there is no God." 
The burden of these early lectures is to show that the trajectory of phi-
losophy tends toward today's widespread intellectual nihilism, a philo-
sophical attitude that McInerny calls "radical chic." The remainder of Part 
I of the book begins a ground-clearing operation for the project of nahlral 
theology, itself taken up more explicitly in Part II. Nihilism or anti-realism 
confronts Aristotle's defense of the first principle of reason, the law of non-
contradiction. Following St. Thomas (just a coincidence?) McInerny argues 
that logical and psychological versions of this principle depend on its onto-
logical formulation: "It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the 
same time and in the same respect" (p. 48). The connection between 
